











This paper deals with the Tanzi method for the estimation of underground economy. The approach is discussed and 
modified. Refinements on the variables and on the econometric technique are proposed. The “adjusted” Tanzi method is 
then used to estimate the shadow economy in Italy along twenty-eight years. Despite the difficulty to obtain point 
estimates, interpretations of the results are nevertheless possible, trustworthy and interesting. For instance, the model 
detects the presence of underground economy, an expected finding. On the other hand the model shows no positive 
trend in the recent period. A very puzzling result, given the mainstream literature and the policymakers claims.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are several important reasons to analyse the underground economy (u.e.): i) national accounts are biased and 
mislead policymakers; ii) economic structure is biased towards little dimension and particular branches; iii) competition 
is biased against the regular agents; iv) u.e. biases the tax system; v) u.e. promotes links between legal and illegal 
activities. 
I used the Tanzi monetary method to measure the size of the underground economy in Italy during the years 1970-1997. 
In applying this method I exploited recent improvements in time series analysis and I adapted the method to the Italian 
situation, in a way different from the USA, the country analysed by Tanzi. Most of these ideas are valid for other 
countries. 
Using  new econometric techniques and tailoring the  procedure to the  Italian reality  don’t  make it possible to get 
indisputable point estimates. Just to give an example, there exist two versions of the Tanzi method which inevitably 
lead to different estimates. I agree with Tanzi (1999, p. 347): “(…) we are still far from the time when the results of 
studies of the underground economy can have immediate consequences for policy or for the adjustment of various 
macroeconomic variables”. Nevertheless, in spite of the lack of precision, it is possible to shed some light on very 
important questions. Is the Italian u.e. growing? Which events, if any, have modified the size of the underground 
economy? On the other hand the Tanzi method is still one of the most commonly used approaches, hence it seems 
unclear why so few works have used this procedure for Italy (Castellucci and Bovi 1999, Bovi 1999,  Saba 1980, 
Schneider and Enste, 2000).  
The next sections deal with the definition of u.e. and describe the method and how it can be made more suitable to the 
Italian economic system. Then I underline some critical points of the Tanzi approach. Econometric analysis, empirical 
results and conclusions close the paper.   3 
II. DEFINITIONS AND METHODS TO MEASURE THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
 
Underground (or black, hidden, moonlight, subterranean, unrecorded, irregular, shadow etc.) economy does not have a 
commonly accepted definition. A good benchmark is the definition worked out in 1993 by the SNA (1993): the u. e. is 
the legal production unknown by the government. Hence illegal activities (gambling, drug dealing, bootlegging etc.) are 
not considered underground economy
1. Of course the borderline of what is legal or not may vary over time and space, 
thus what makes up u. e. is fickle. According to this framework, the main cause of the black economy is the attempt of 
avoiding taxes and regulations. I followed this definition both because it is an official one and because it makes the 
Tanzi method a proper device
2.    
There  are  direct  and  indirect  methods  to  measure  the  underground  economy.  The  former  use  data  from  national 
accounts,  surveys  on  household  balance-sheets  and  fiscal  micro  data.  The  latter  compare  economic  indicators  as 
national expenditure and income statistics, input and relative output, actual and “theoretical” currency. In this work I 
used the monetary indirect method (Cagan 1958, Gutmann 1977, Feige 1979) as revised by Tanzi (1980, 1982, 1983).  
Obviously  there  not  exist  an  indisputable  method  to  measure  a  complex  and  fuzzy  phenomenon  like  the  shadow 
economy. Each approach has pros and cons. As a matter of fact one of the results of this work is to show how difficult it 
is to achieve point estimates even using just one method. I preferred the Tanzi method for two main reasons. It allows 
us to estimate u. e. for a long span of time because it analyses aggregate time series relatively easy to obtain for many 
years. In this way we can study the u. e. from an historical point of view, a very difficult task to achieve using survey 
data. Then the Tanzi method allows us to exploit new techniques in time series analysis (Mizon 1977, Johansen 1988, 
Hendry  1995)  not  only  because  it  uses  time  series,  but  also  because  it  does  not  deal  with  the  dynamics  of  the 
underground economy. Therefore we can exploit the so-called “let the data speak” approach suggested by Hendry (see 
section 5). 
                                                           
1 It is worth noting that inefficiencies in collecting official data leading to under reporting are not considered underground economy because there is 
not the explicit will not to respect the (non penal) law. Likewise domestic and personal services produced and consumed within the same household 
(e.g. cleaning, the care of sick or elderly people) are legal activities unrecorded by national accounts that are not considered underground economy. 
Given that all these activities should not affect the currency demand, the Tanzi method is a proper device to detect the kind of u.e. depicted by the 
System of National Accounts definition. 
2 The Tanzi method detects the tax evasion as well, but the u.e. is larger than the tax evasion. We can conceive of an economy without taxes (hence 
without evasion) but with a strictly positive rate of u.e. caused by regulations.    4 
III. THE TANZI METHOD APPLIED TO ITALY 
 
Tanzi specifies an equation for the currency-deposits ratio as a function of the real per capita GDP, the interest rate on 
time deposits, the ratio of wages and salaries to national income and an income tax variable. The importance of this 
latter variable lies in the following fundamental hypotheses: 
 
1)  underground economy depends on the presence of taxes; 
2)  in the underground economy transactions are carried out in cash for the obvious reason of not leaving traces; 
3)  in the underground and in the regular economy the velocity of money is the same. 
 
The estimate of currency holdings in the hypothesis of zero income tax is used to compute the “excessive” (i.e. tax 
induced)  currency  holdings  due  to  underground  economy.  The  size  of  u.e.  is  then  calculated  by  multiplying  the 
excessive currency by the velocity of money prevailing in the regular economy (see point 3). Tanzi suggests to evaluate 
the u.e. using a positive but minimum tax rate of a reference year as well: “As it is unrealistic to conceive of an 
economic without taxes (and restrictions), it does not seem very productive to attempt to measure all the underground 
activities but it seems preferable to concentrate on changes over relevant periods." (Tanzi 1980, p. 84). In this second 
case the extra currency holdings due to u.e. is estimated under the hypothesis that the income tax rate is always equal to 
its sample minimum.  
To actually estimate the equation for the Italian economic system, I changed the ratio of wages and salaries to national 
income with the ratio of wages and salaries paid in the agricultural and building sectors to total because in Italy these 
wages and salaries are more often paid in cash than the others. Then, but in this case the adjustments have a general 
validity, I used the data of the household sector only because it is the main sector which demands cash to evade. 
Further, this is the sector whose demand for currency depends primarily upon the above explicative variables while the 
banks’ currency holding is, for instance, partially determined by the required reserves. Also I used the domestic per 
capita demand (GDP less changes in inventories and exports) and not per capita GDP because it should be a better 
proxy of the evolution in the domestic system of payments.  
As tax rate I chose the ratio of total direct revenues collected by the public sector to national value added at factor costs. 
This variable is not the only option and suffers from some pitfall. Other things equal, an increase (decrease) in direct 
revenues collected by the public sector implies a reduction of (a raise in) u. e., but the model shows the opposite. In 
addition, the decision not to declare (or under declare) income is more likely based on the marginal than on the average 
rate. Anyway this direct effective tax rate has some advantage as well. First of all it is easily available for many years. 
Then it can take into account the u. e. caused by the VAT. When taxpayers (self-employed persons) under declare the 
value added, the direct effective tax rate increases because of the reduction in its denominator. That way the method 
rightly detects an increase in the underground economy.   5 
IV. CRITIQUES TO THE TANZI METHOD 
 
In the previous section I showed some of the problems and some of the possible interventions in the choice of the 
variables suggested by Tanzi. It is worthless to say that we can obtain as many different estimates as (equally plausible) 
sets of variables we choose. But other critical and more specific points have been emphasised by the literature. The 
most recurrent are the following (Schneider and Enste 2000, Feige 1986, Pozo 1996). Not all transactions in the u. e. are 
paid in cash, thus estimates are likely to be under-valued. Second, it is obvious that the shadow economy is not caused 
only by taxes. Given the tax rate, government regulations, the complexity of the fiscal system and its efficiency in 
detecting and in prosecuting the tax evader can modify the size of the underground economy. To the extent these 
variables  are  positively  correlated  with  the  tax  rate,  their  omission  can  lead  to  an  over-estimation  of  the  hidden 
economy. In a recent work, Schneider (1998) tried to tackle these problems. Third, it is unrealistic to conceive both an 
economy without taxes, and the total absence of underground economy in the year(s) of the minimum tax rate. Anyway, 
given that these hypotheses seem to be opposite extremes, it could be useful to match their results. The hypothesis of a 
unique velocity of money is another critical point mentioned by Tanzi as well  (1980). However it is reasonable to think 
that when the “underground” money (i. e. the excessive currency caused by taxes) is used in regular markets, it should 
behave exactly in the same way as “regular” money in order not to appear suspicious. If this is true, the distinction 
between the source (from underground incomes) and the destination (towards consumption) links the Tanzi method to 
approaches based on the hypothesis that people tend to (or can) hide much more income than consumption. In addition, 
we can say that the method is less microfounded than, for instance, the pioneeristic work by Allingham and Sandmo
3 
(Allingham  and  Sandmo  1972).  This  is  a  well-known  issue  because  the  dichotomy  between  micro  and  macro 
approaches to u. e. is very common in the literature (Thomas 1988).  
Other critiques can be raised. In the method no mention is made about the dynamics of the underground economy. 
However it should be clear that the decision to go (or to remain) underground, just like any other human decision, is 
subject to adjustment costs, information lags, etc. that obliges to work out the Tanzi’s steady state equation (see the next 
section). Then it is possible that illegal economy uses cash as well, and that criminal activity is positively correlated to 
underground economy (Schneider and Enste 2000). Hence the parameter of the income-tax variable, and consequently 
the u.e., could be over-estimated. Lastly, we may think about different currency demand equations. 
All these remarks make the Tanzi method debatable and its point estimates untrustworthy. But the procedure is not 
useless, and not only because it still remains one of the most commonly used approach. By making adjustments, by 
applying new econometric techniques, and by focusing only on the principal features of the estimates, we can reach 
interesting results (see concluding remarks). 
                                                           
3 This study deal only with the tax evasion, but the underground economy is strictly correlated with the tax evasion (see note 2).     6 
V. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
Apart from the aforementioned interventions to adapt the variables to the Italian situation, the Tanzi’s original equation 
looks like the following
4 (the prefix L stands for natural logs): 
 
(LC-LM2)t = b0 + b1LTDIRt + b2LWSNIt + b3LRt + b4LYXt + Xt                      (1) 
 
where: 
C = stock of currency held by the household sector; 
M2 = stock of M2 held by household the sector (currency and deposits); 
bi = parameters (bi > 0, if i = 1,2; bi < 0, if i = 3,4); 
TDIR = one plus effective tax rate (ratio of total direct revenues collected by the public sector to national value added at 
factor costs); 
WSNI = ratio of wages and salaries paid in the agricultural and building sectors to total wages and salaries; 
R = net interest rate on time deposits; 
YX = real domestic per capita demand (GDP less changes in inventories and exports);  
X = residual.  
 
I estimated equation (1) following two alternative routes. The Wickens-Breusch approach (Wickens and Breusch 1988) 
and the Johansen procedure (Johansen 1988). The former
5 suggests to start from an over-parameterised-ECM version of 
the steady state equation worked out by theory: 
 
D(LC-LM2)t =  a1D(LTDIR) t  + a2D(LWSNI) t + a3D (LR) t  +  a4 D(LYX) t +    
        +(b5-1)[(LC-LM2)t-1+b0+b1LTDIR t-1+b2LWSNIt-1+b3LRt-1+b4LYXt-1]+Et                         (2) 
 
where: 
a, b = parameters; (b5-1)<0; 
D(X) t = first difference of variable X = X t-X t-1; 
E = residual. 
 
There are economic and statistical reasons to apply the so-called “general-to-specific” approach to equation (1) (Hendry 
1995). The former depends on the presence of adjustment costs, information lags, etc., in the decision to go (or to 
remain) underground. That is to say, equation (1) could be valid in the long run, but surely is not valid in each period. 
Granger’s words can shed some light on the relationships between the short run and the long run  (p. 213, 1986): “at the 
least sophisticated level of economic theory lies the belief that certain pairs of economic variables should not diverge 
from each other by too great an extent, at least in the long run. Thus, such variables may drift apart in the short-run (…), 
                                                           
4 Actually I tried to plug into the equation (1) the male labour force participation rate as a measure of the degree of regulation in the economy. Results 
show that the findings here obtained are robust.  
5 There is some evidence that the estimators of the long run parameters have a smaller sample bias than that of two-step procedure worked out by 
Engle and Granger (Engle and Granger, 1987).   7 
but if they continue to be too far in the long-run, the economic forces, such as a market mechanism or government 
intervention, will begin to bring them together again”.  
The statistical reasons are pointed out by recent developments in time series analysis (Banerjee et al. 1993), which 
showed that the standard regression techniques are invalid when applied to non-stationary variables. This is the case for 
the variables here used, which become stationary after first differencing (see next section). The long run solution (1) is 
still visible in equation (2), but the latter is a better starting point to estimate because its disturbances are more likely 
innovations
6 for the relevant information set. In other words, the over-parameterisation is a clear case of “measurement 
without theory” (Thomas 1999), but the “let the data speak” approach (Hendry 1995) could be a working answer. 
While the Wickens-Breusch approach suggests to estimate the single equation (2), the Johansen procedure is a system 
(maximum-likelihood) estimation. Shortly, Johansen’s method is to test the restrictions imposed by cointegration on the 
unrestricted VAR involving the series. This means that the “general” is no more equation (2), but a reparametrised 
VAR: 
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where: 
= = vector made up by 5 variables of the system suggested by Tanzi [(LC-LM2), LTDIR, LWSNI, LR, LYX], 
' = vector of the deterministic components of the system, 
*3, \ = 5x5 matrices of the system coefficients, 
5 = vector of the system residuals. 
 
Variables are cointegrated if and only if the rank of 3 is neither full nor zero. If the rank is equal to r (r is the number of 
cointegrating relations, that is to say the cointegrating rank, in the present case: 0<r<5), then we may write 3=DE
, D
and Ebeing two 5xr matrices. In the previous single equation case, Ewas the vector of parameters bi, while Dwas equal 
to (b5-1). In the hypothesis of cointegration we may write: 
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To determine the number of cointegrating relations r, we can proceed sequentially from r = 0 to r = 5-1 until we fail to 
reject. Summing up, the Johansen test strategy is the multivariate analogue of DF test. The point is that both over and 
under  estimation  of  the  number  of  cointegrating  vectors  have  potentially  serious consequences  for  estimation  and 
inference. But the number of cointegrating vectors is unknown and must first be determined from the data. Hence the 
Johansen procedure has several advantages in comparison with the single equation approach. Anyway the philosophy 
behind these two procedures is different and is not useless to match their results. 
    
                                                           
6 The (testable) hypothesis is that, lagging once, residuals become innovations.     8 
VI. RESULTS 
 
In this section I report the estimates of the u.e. in Italy in the period 1970-1997 using the ECM version of the Tanzi 
equation as outlined in the preceding discussion. The testing down procedure applied to the equation (2) led to the 




The Wickens-Breusch approach 
 
============================================================ 
     Regressor       OLS Coeff.   S.E
7.     t-stat.    Prob.             
============================================================ 
         C           2.278597   0.933837   2.440037   0.0247           
     D(LWSNI)t       0.995172   0.335966   2.962123   0.0080           
       D(LR)t       -0.094072   0.036975  -2.544238   0.0198           
      D(LYX)t       -1.585690   0.564665  -2.808195   0.0112           
     LTDIRt-1        0.274714   0.125079   2.196323   0.0407           
      LRt-1         -0.128493   0.044867  -2.863882   0.0099           
      LYXt-1        -1.515609   0.558514  -2.713645   0.0138           
 (LC-LM2)t-1        -0.629098   0.209041  -3.009456   0.0072           
============================================================ 
R-squared            0.622461    Mean dependent var-0.018518           
Adjusted R-squared   0.483367    S.D. dependent var 0.055056           
S.E. of regression   0.039573    Akaike info criter-3.380158           
Sum squared resid    0.029754    Schwarz criterion -2.996206           
Log likelihood       53.63213    F-statistic        4.475128           
Durbin-Watson stat   1.829437    Prob(F-statistic)  0.004304           
============================================================ 
Dependent variable: D(LC-LM2)t 
Legend: see text. 
 
Data suggest that the influence of the variable LWSNI is limited to the short term. Conversely, the dynamics of LTDIR 
are  statistically  not  significant.  Residuals  satisfy the  most  commonly  used  diagnostic  tests  (Jarque-Bera,  Breusch-
Godfrey, Ramsey RESET, ARCH, CUSUM, CUSUMSQ) so the model is a satisfactory one
8.  
A careful treatment of data is very important especially when we are interested in estimating a shadow. Hence I looked 
for a confirmation of previous findings by applying the Johansen procedure. Since it is valid only for non-stationary 
series, I performed some usual unit root tests
9 (ADF and Phillips-Perron). Results strongly demonstrate the I(1) nature 
of all the five series [(LC-LM2), LTDIR, LWSNI, LR, LYX]. 
After having confirmed that LWSNI does not enter the long run solution, I performed the Johansen cointegration test on 
the vector made up by the four left out variables. The so-called “trace test” indicates one cointegrating equation at 1% 
significance level and two cointegrating equations at 5% significance level, the maximal-eigenvalue statistic indicates 
one cointegrating equation at 5% significance level. Hence the hypothesis that there are two unit roots can reasonably 
be rejected in favour of only one cointegrating vector. This findings is very important for inference because if the ECM 
                                                           
7 White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors (White, 1980). 
8 I  tested for weak exogeneity as well. In particular the marginal processes of the RHS variables seems does not have the same ECM. Anyway this is 
only a necessary condition for the use of single-equation methods (Banerjee et al. 1993). 
9 As well known it is hard to understand if a variable is stationary in small samples. Anyway given that in this case the aim is to estimate and not to 
forecast, it suffices to verify if the  variables are stationary in the available sample.    9 
terms enter more than one equation this would violate the weak exogeneity requisite (Engle et al. 1983). The presence 
of only one cointegrating vector makes the single-equation approach valid. 
We are now in a position to compare the long run solution of the two approaches. 
 
WICKENS- BREUSCH: 
(LC-LM2) t = 3.61  +0.44*LTDIRt  -0.20*LRt  -2.41*LYXt  
JOHANSEN: 
(LC-LM2) t = 5.73  +0.92*LTDIRt  -0.28*LRt  -3.58*LYXt     
 
In spite of different methods and samples (and dynamics
10, see equations (2) and (4)), results seems to be relatively 
similar with the notable exemption of the parameter of LTDIR. In other words the “underground parameter” is the most 
difficult to catch. Applying both extreme versions of the Tanzi method (zero income taxes and minimum tax rate, see 
section 3) to these two equations we may calculate four estimates of underground economy for Italy in the period 1970-
1997.  
                                                           
10 Having eliminated LWSNI from the system, I excluded D(LWSNI)-1 as well.   10 
                                                             Table 2. 
                            Underground Economy in Italy as % of domestic demand 
=========================================================== 
  obs       (1)          (2)           (3)          (4)      
=========================================================== 
 1970     21.41189     33.60610     00000000     00000000             
 1971     21.49041     33.37255     0.402860     0.816457             
 1972     21.86945     34.69754     1.469466     3.032876             
 1973     17.75225     24.96656     0.667459     1.266099             
 1974     15.23189     19.59763     0.250276     0.443749             
 1975     22.01293     31.21585     1.112427     2.102993             
 1976     20.74897     28.79458     2.495710     4.653861             
 1977     19.11558     25.66700     3.380059     6.139794             
 1978     20.18752     27.96684     4.792558     8.902220             
 1979     17.08060     21.80455     3.874599     6.730917             
 1980     15.74918     19.65959     4.448475     7.539176             
 1981     15.62205     20.08450     5.180940     8.962265             
 1982     16.11328     21.15542     5.780765     10.15230             
 1983     16.69879     21.84205     6.244216     10.90264             
 1984     16.79152     22.08995     6.387610     11.20040             
 1985     18.43070     25.24064     7.132873     12.95100             
 1986     16.20076     20.92441     6.284988     10.82583             
 1987     16.54918     21.47381     6.632537     11.44844             
 1988     15.67366     19.46893     6.372151     10.55561             
 1989     15.65557     19.44403     6.709896     11.06812             
 1990     16.81968     20.75906     7.221036     11.84138             
 1991     15.48260     18.70546     6.738790     10.81894             
 1992     15.94124     19.34226     6.982636     11.24983             
 1993     18.45846     24.25272     8.522114     14.71557             
 1994     18.94867     25.08859     8.332863     14.54949             
 1995     18.11733     23.64067     7.920494     13.65303             
 1996     17.28410     22.37733     7.775617     13.27561             
 1997     16.99550     23.64730     7.906215     14.38743             
=========================================================== 
(1) Wickens-Breusch single equation method with Tanzi “zero income taxes” hypothesis (see section 3) 
(2) Johansen system estimation method with Tanzi  “zero income taxes” hypothesis (see section 3) 
(3) Wickens-Breusch single equation method with Tanzi  “minimum tax rate”  hypothesis (see section 3) 
(4) Johansen system estimation method with Tanzi  “minimum tax rate”  hypothesis (see section 3) 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper I made some adjustments on the variables and on the econometric technique of the Tanzi method. It is 
worth noting that these adjustments have a general validity. Here I applied them to Italy to verify the presence of 
underground economy in the period 1970-1997. Not surprisingly, and as already reported by other works (Saba 1980, 
Schneider and Enste 2000 and, regarding non monetary methods, Frey and Weck 1983, Deaglio 1985, Italian National 
Statistical Institute 1993), data confirm the existence of the phenomenon.  
Looking at the wide range of the estimates obtained (see table 2), one remains puzzled. Anyway this is simply one of 
the results of this work: it is not possible to achieve fully accepted point estimates of the underground economy and the 
“face values” are rather misleading even using the same method. Tanzi’s two alternatives – the complete absence of u.e. 
in a given year or the complete absence of taxes - are extreme cases that could include, but that can not catch the precise 
size of the shadow economy.  
Nevertheless from the estimates we can draw some interesting results. As a matter of fact, the reported estimates 
include common elements that, being based on different hypotheses, are robust and reliable. Among these elements the 
more apparent is the absence of a clear growing trend in the series of the underground economy. This finding is quite 
astonishing because it goes counter to the mainstream of the literature, which often reports growing trends (Schneider 
and Enste, 2000). The absence of a growing trend may be indirectly confirmed by looking at the level of regulations. 
There should be a positive correlation between the level of regulations and black economy and in Italy results that the 
former was higher in the eighties than in the following decade (OECD 1999). Further, data from the Italian national 
statistical institute (ISTAT) show that in the period 1980-1997 the ratio of irregular to total workers increased only 
slightly from 21.2% to 22.6%.    
Another common feature of the series reported in table 2 is the minimum reached in 1974. One explanation can deal 
with the starting of the tax reform that deeply changed the Italian fiscal system. The  UDWLR is that in the earlier years 
evading was easier, while in the following ones the u.e. regressed to “pre-reform” level because of the reaction of 
economic agents to the new economic environment. 0XWDWLVPXWDQGLV, similar reasoning can explain the common peak 
realised in the 1993. Since this year Italian policy makers began to exercise an overwhelming fiscal discipline to match 
the European commitments. This pushed up the level of the underground economy, but data suggest that economic 
agents reacted once again to the shock lowering the level under the previous maximum. In other words, the Italian u.e. 
tend to revert to the pre-shock values. On the other hand all the reported estimates show that during the eighties, a 
period of relatively smooth (or less shocking) fiscal policies, the shadow economy quietly oscillated around a stable 
mean.  
Summing up not even two large shocks, like the tax reform and the European commitments, were able to permanently 
modify the level of the u.e. in Italy. It could demonstrate the presence of a sort of “natural rate” of black economy 
(Castellucci and Bovi 1999). This rate could be seen as the rate imposed to the economic system by structural (market 
and/or institutional) forces that prevent the ratio of irregular to regular economy to maintain, in the medium-long term, 
values too far from the natural one. We can also see the natural rate of shadow economy as the economic counterpart of 
the statistical ECM(s) here found. Obviously to say more about the natural rate of the u.e. a deeper theoretical analysis 
would be necessary. Given that the goals of this paper are eminently empirical, very little remains to be said but to 
follow the advice to close the gap between the statistical approach to the cointegration and the steady state solutions 
derived from the economic theory (Pesaran 1997).  
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Estimation of Italian underground economy based on the Tanzi monetary method maybe improved taking into account 
both the peculiarities of the Italian economic system and the recent time series econometric techniques. Despite the 








Die Schätzung der unoffiziellen Italienischen Wirtschaft, basierend auf der Tanzi währungs Kontroll Methode, könnte 
verbessert  werden  durch  Berücksichtigung  der  Carakteristik  des  Italienischen  Wirtschaftssystems  und  der  kürzlich  
eingeführten  wirtschaftlichen  Techniken.  Trotz  der  Schwierigkeit  genaue  Prognosen  zu  erstellen,  sind 








L' estimation de l' économie souterraine italienne, basée sur la méthode monetaire à la Tanzi peut être ameliorée en 
considerant les caractéristiques du système économique italien aussi bien que les nouvelles techniques econometriques. 
Malgré  la  difficulté  à  obtenir  des  estimations  ponctuelles,  l' interpretation  des  résultats  est  néamoins  possible  et 
interessante. 
 
 